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Book Reviews
an important segment of the American mind in the nineteenth
century.
If the twentieth century is the age of sociology, then the first
half of the nineteenth century was part of the age of religion.
Americans tended to think about social problems in religious
terms. Slavery was not simply an inefficient economic system
that harmed both the slaveholder and slave alike, it was a moral
evil. Opposition to the extension of slavery was not a social or
economic program, it was a holy crusade. When the editors of
the religious press dealt with issues in these terms, they reflected
the thinking of a large part of the population. It is precisely this
that makes the antebellum religious newspaper a valuable his-
torical source, and Norton's work is a valuable introductory
study of this source.
Alan M. Schroder
Iowa State Historical Department
Division of the State Historical Society
Iowa City, IA
Shiloh—in Hell before Night, by James Lee McDonough. Knox-
ville: University of Tennessee Press, 1977. pp. xii, 260. $9.95.
Confusion and ineptness characterized the fledgling armies of
the North and South during the first year of the Civil War.
Something of a carnival spirit, fostered by a belief that one
major battle would decide the war, affected the unseasoned re-
cruits and the more experienced commanders as well. The hopes
for a short conflict and the somewhat cavalier approach to war
by some died an agonizing death at Shiloh. The carnage of this
battle, its causes and consequences, are documented in James
Lee McDonough's Shiloh—in Hell before Night.
McDonough asserts that the Confederates had the chance to
turn the Union army's lightly defended left flank and destroy
the forces of General Ulysses S. Grant. This would have turned
the Union tide in the West and perhaps prevented the Yankees
from severing Confederate east-west communications. The
Confederates had to win to keep from being split by a Union
wedge. Due to the confusion between Confederate Generals Al-
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bert Sydney Johnson and P. G. T. Beauregard, however, the
Union flank was never successfully enveloped. McDonough
maintains that Beauregard's termination of the attack late in the
afternoon of April 6 was not contested by General Braxton
Bragg and was a logical decision. Subsequently labelled as "the
lost opportunity," the decision to retire was based on Beaure-
gard's belief that he could annihilate Grant's army the following
morning. McDonough concludes that had the Confederates
seized upon the weaknesses of the Union positions and won the
battle. Grant and General William T. Sherman would have
been relieved. With Grant and Sherman out of command, the
complexion of the war would have been quite different.
McDonough should be commended for describing the battle
in human as well as strategic terms. To accomplish this he has
incorporated a plethora of personal accounts, unit histories,
and official reports. With personal recollections, however, he is
careful to verify the accounts with the impressions of others or
official records. Conflicting impressions by the participants are
often presented for the reader's assessment. As a consequence,
most of the work is based on primary sources.
There are some aspects of the work which tend to interfere
with the flow of the narrative. Too many individual stories can
impede the reader's grasp of the complex facets of a battle. In
the same way, recurring descriptions of battered corpses, al-
though valid with the carnage of Shiloh, can lose their effective-
ness. Repetition of this type tends to dull the sensitivity of one
who must rely on a written account for the story of war. The
constant designation of the various regiments, invaluable for
the tracing of unit activities, can also confuse the general reader.
Only when a unit is unique, such as one with excessive casual-
ities or one which fled the field, should specific distinctions be
made. Otherwise, there is little gained in differentiating be-
tween the 5th, 7th, 9th, and 10th Mississippi.
For the military historian in search of a work on either the
western campaigns, a decisive battle of the war, or Shiloh spe-
cifically, Shiloh—in Hell before Night is heartily recommended.
Larry D. Roberts
Oklahoma State University
Stillwater, OK
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